Government-Owned Media: The Government as Speaker and Censor by Berger, Linda L.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 4
1985
Government-Owned Media: The Government as
Speaker and Censor
Linda L. Berger
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation




GOVERNMENT AS SPEAKER AND CENSOR
When government operates a communications medium, it may either promote
first amendment values, by ensuring a diverse marketplace of ideas, or hinder them,
by censoring the information and ideas it conveys. This Note proposes a synthesis of
government speech and government forum analyses which would provide first amend-
ment limitations on government-operated media while still allowing government to
exercise editorial discretion.
INTRODUCTION
THE NOTION THAT government cannot suppress speech be-
cause of its content is a central theme of first amendment analy-
sis.' Yet government often does engage in content control. When
public school boards prescribe curricula,2 when public officials de-
cide what to include in or exclude from public reports,3 and when
public libraries decide which books to put on the shelves,4 govern-
ment agencies and officials are restricting expression "because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 5
What takes these examples out of the realm of censorship and
places them into the realm of legitimate governmental discretion is
1. E.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 57 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the First Amendment's central proscription [is] against censor-
ship"); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("the
State may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that
idea"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (the "choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dan-
gers of its misuse if it is freely available, [is one] that the First Amendment makes for us");
Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("government has no power to restrict expres-
sion because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content"). See also Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 545-46 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("the subject matter, or, indeed, even the point of view of the speaker, may pro-
vide a justification for a time, place and manner regulation . . . . [But a] regulation of
speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular
point of view. . . is the purest example" of a first amendment violation).
2. See, eg., Pico, 457 U.S. at 862 ("Respondents do not seek in this Court to impose
limitations upon their school board's discretion to prescribe the curricula ....").
3. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 6-10 (1983).
4. Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 570 n.23 (1980).
5. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
a difference in purpose.6 Government legitimately exercises its dis-
cretion when it attempts to carry out a necessary function: educa-
tion, information, or cultural enrichment.7 When government
censors, it aims at the content of speech or at its effects;8 expression
is suppressed because government fears or disagrees with what is
being said.9
In its role as a state public broadcaster,' ° government can act
either as speaker or as censor." It is ironic that state public broad-
casting poses first amendment problems, because the purpose of
public broadcasting legislation' 2 was to encourage expression. Con-
gress created the public broadcasting system as an alternative
source of information and programming in response to concerns
that powerful owners and commercial advertisers controlled tradi-
tional programming.13 Nevertheless, fears of federal censorship of
the content of public broadcasting programs have proven well-
founded, 4 even though decentralized, local control of the stations
has limited its effects.' 5 State and local government censorship,
through publicly funded, government-operated broadcasting sta-
tions, was less expected.
The issue of state censorship arose in Muir v. Alabama Educa-
tional Television Commission.6 There, the Fifth Circuit held that
the first amendment does not preclude state public broadcasting sta-
tions from making editorial programming choices, although it does
6. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-5 to -6, at 592-97 (1978).
7. M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 38-41.
8. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-2, at 580.
9. Id.
10. "Public broadcasting" encompasses not only noncommercial and publicly supported
television and radio stations but also those owned and operated by instrumentalities of the
state and local government. This Note focuses on government-owned and -operated stations,
rather than on noncommercial stations operated by nonprofit agencies and organizations.
The term "state broadcaster" is used in this Note to refer to stations owned and operated by
state and local government agencies and to differentiate them from other public broadcasters.
11. Note, Editorial Discretion of State Public Broadcasting Licensees, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1161 (1982).
12. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399 (1982 & West Supp. 1984)).
13. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PRO-
GRAM FOR ACTION 13-8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE COMM'N]; see FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3110 (1984).
14. Note, supra note 11, at 1165-66 n.32; see also League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at
3127 (47 U.S.C. § 399 violates first amendment right of broadcasting station, funded by Cor-
poration for Public Broadcasting, to editorialize).
15. M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 131-33.
16. 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1274 (1983).
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not protect their choices either. 7 This Note focuses on Muir and
proposes a series of first amendment limitations on the operation of
state-owned communications media.18 The limitations are based on
the premise that government is acting without a legitimate purpose
when it suppresses speech solely because of its content or effect on
the listener. 19 Society's rights to curb or counter government
speech"0 and the rights of speakers and listeners to be free of con-
tent-based suppression in a government forum2" at these times out-
weigh government interests in speaking or editing. 2
Part I of this Note discusses first amendment values and emerg-
ing rights.2 3 Part II traces the development of the right-of-access
theory, which asserts that government has an affirmative obligation
to foster free expression. 4 Part III examines government speech
and government forum analyses and derives from them first amend-
ment limitations on government-owned media,25 and Part IV ex-
plores the application of these limits in the context of Muir.26
Finally, Part V proposes a merger of government speech and gov-
ernment forum analyses to establish a right to be free from illegiti-
mate government interference with expression in the public
broadcasting system. 7
I. FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND RIGHTS
A. Values
The first amendment declares, "Congress shall make no law
• ..abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... -28 It
protects freedom of expression for two reasons. First, free speech
helps society to achieve fundamental objectives. By encouraging
free expression and discussion of diverse views, the first amendment
aids in the search for truth,29 ensures enlightened self-govern-
17. 688 F.2d at 1043-44.
18. See infra notes 204-69 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 1.
20. See infra notes 115-32 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
22. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-2, at 580-81.
23. See infra notes 28-70 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 71-96 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 97-153 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 154-203 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 204-69 and accompanying text.
28. U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
29. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market").
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ment, 30 promotes social stability,31 and provides a structural check
on governmental power.32 This "instrumental view" of free expres-
sion focuses on the values gained by society.33 Second, free speech
is important for the individual. By protecting individual thought
and expression, the first amendment guarantees individual auton-
omy 34 and encourages individual development. 35 This "individual
autonomy" or "liberty view" emphasizes individual rights.36
Generally, the two views reinforce one another. Society gains
from the protection of individual free speech-more ideas enter the
marketplace, and information necessary for political decisionmak-
ing circulates. Moreover, this protection encourages criticism of
and comment on government operations and provides a peaceful
outlet for such expression.37
However, the two views conflict when the first amendment is
advanced to achieve societal goals in a manner that clashes with the
countervailing interests of an individual.38 Such affirmative use of
the first amendment has been advocated to ensure speakers' rights
to effective nongovernmental forums and to protect listeners' rights
to receive information from diverse sources.39 The countervailing
individual interest usually is a private broadcaster's. 1
Conflict may also arise when speech interests clash with govern-
30. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 57 (1960).
31. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-8 (1970).
32. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 A.B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 521.
33. T. EMERSON, supra note 31, at 8.
34. Id.; L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-1, at 576 (freedom of speech is partially "an end in
itself, an expression of the sort of society we wish to become and the sort of persons we wish
to be"); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966
(1978) ("The liberty model holds that the free speech clause protects... an arena of individ-
ual liberty from certain types of governmental restrictions").
35. T. EMERSON, supra note 31, at 6.
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 18-19. See also B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 28
(1976) ("Perhaps the most basic question is whether the First Amendment contains both
principles of individual (or institutional) autonomy and social policies of diversity of expres-
sion-ideas that, in some circumstances, may conflict.").
39. See J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
MASS MEDIA (1973); Z. CHAFEE, 2 GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 471-75
(1947); W. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 161-90 (1947); B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38;
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967);
Lange, The Role ofthe Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media, 52 N.C.L. REV.
1 (1973). In the context of public broadcasting, see Comment, Access to State-Owned Com-
munications Media-The Public Forum Doctrine, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1410 (1979).
40. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Supreme
[Vol. 35:707
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mental interests.41 Although primarily a negative limitation on
government interference with the free exchange of ideas, the first
amendment can affirmatively ensure speakers' access to public fo-
rums.42 In these situations, there is no conflict between the access
granted and another expressive right, as there is when a private
broadcaster is forced to allow a political candidate to speak.43
B. First Amendment Rights
The notion that the first amendment imposes affirmative obliga-
tions on government to open public and private forums led to the
articulation of a new right. The right to hear, while less focused
than the right to speak, stems from the assumption that freedom of
thought and expression is meaningless without the right to obtain
information and ideas from diverse sources.44
1. The Right to Speak
The first amendment undoubtedly limits government suppres-
sion of the right to speak. 45 The scope of this limitation is broad.
Court has traditionally subordinated broadcaster's interests to the interests of listeners. Id. at
390; see also infra note 43 and accompanying text (equal opportunity for political candidates).
41. Governmental interests include such matters as peace and order on the public streets
and national security concerns with publication of certain information. See, eg., Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (where advocacy is directed to and is likely to incite
imminent lawless action, a state may limit constitutional guarantees of free speech and press);
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (ordering prelim-
inary injunction against publication of information about how to produce a hydrogen bomb
because of national security concerns).
42. See B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 29 ("The Bill of Rights generally reflects a con-
ception of liberty as a collection of negative controls on official power. Consequently, the
First Amendment has been viewed in negative terms."); cf notes 133-42 and accompanying
text (affirmative and negative obligations for public forums); T. EMERSON, supra note 31, at
629 ("the government must affirmatively make available the opportunity for expression as
well as protect it from encroachment").
43. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding constitutionality of 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(7) (1982), which requires licensees to provide reasonable access to candidates for
federal office); see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367 (upholding constitutionality of "fairness
doctrine," currently codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1983)); 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982) (re-
quiring broadcasters to afford equal opportunities to other candidates for same office when
broadcaster has allowed time to one candidate); see infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text
(access to private media for citizens to express views).
44. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
First Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas. . . .The freedom to
speak and the freedom to hear are inseparable [from] the process of thought and discus-
sion."); Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 ("[Ihe
right to know serves much the same function in our society as the right to communicate. It is
essential to personal self-fulfillment. It is a significant method for seeking the truth. . . . It
is necessary for collective decision-making.").
45. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1967) (the Framers
1985]
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Prior restraints on speakers because of the content of their speech
bear a "heavy presumption" of unconstitutionality.46 However,
speakers can be barred from some government facilities because of
the content of their speech, 7 and can be punished for the content of
their speech when it is incitive, libelous, or obscene.4a
The right to speak includes the right to exercise editorial discre-
tion.49 Since all speech involves selection, editorial decisionmaking
is simply a part of the process of protected expression. The
Supreme Court has held this view paramount in its treatment of
newspaper editors,5" and, accordingly, editors have been afforded
full speech protection. Even newspaper editors are limited, how-
ever, when they are simply selecting from among commercial adver-
tisers51 and not performing a truly editorial function.
The private broadcaster's role has been viewed differently. 2
intended that the first amendment provide a "right of unrestricted discussion of public af-
fairs"); L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 236 (1960) (first amendment at least means gov-
ernment cannot interfere to suppress speech before publication).
To some extent, the government can control the speech of its own employees. See, eg.,
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)
(free speech rights of federal employees not violated by prohibiting them from taking active
part in political management or political campaigns). However, federal employees, unlike
private employees, can assert their constitutional rights against their employer. See, eg.,
Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (when government employee's speech involves a
matter of public concern, first amendment protects him against undue action by his employer,
such as dismissal).
46. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
47. See, eg., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
48. The relevant limits are set by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (constitu-
tional to punish speech directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action and likely
to incite or produce such action); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(public official cannot recover damages for libel unless statement made with actual malice);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (states may set own standard for libel of
private person, so long as they do not impose liability without fault); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973) (materials are obscene, and therefore unprotected by the first amendment, if
the average person would find them appealing to the prurient interest of sex, they are patently
offensive, and they lack any serious social value).
49. See Note, supra note 11, at 1172.
50. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). "IThe First
Amendment erects a virtually insurmountable barrier between government and the print me-
dia so far as government tampering, in advance of publication, with news and editorial con-
tent is concerned." Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
51. See infra note 91.
52. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of
viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is paramount."); see also CBS v.
FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981) (by balancing the rights of speakers, listeners, and broadcast-
ers, statute requiring reasonable access for individual candidates makes a contribution to




The Court views the broadcaster as a conduit for speech rather than
as a speaker. Consequently, listeners' interests in diverse speech
outweigh the broadcaster's interests.-
3
2. The Right to Hear
The right to hear at least protects a willing listener's interest in
receiving information and ideas from willing speakers without gov-
ernmental interference. 4 Again, the justification for the right is
that it is essential to the process of free expression, for without it,
the express guarantee of free speech would be meaningless.55
The listener's right to hear, taken together with the speaker's
right to speak, generally prevents the government from inhibiting
communication.56 The listener's interests may, however, conflict
with the interests of the speaker. This conflict is apparent in the
cases upholding government regulation of broadcasting,57 at least if
broadcasters are considered to be speakers. The broadcaster's inter-
est in making autonomous editorial choices conflicts with society's
interests in disseminating diverse information and ideas. In those
situations, the Supreme Court has found the public's interest to be
paramount on the grounds that those receiving a license to use a
scarce public resource should act as trustees for the public. 8
53. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390; cf. infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text (criticiz-
ing notion of public broadcasters as public trustees).
54. See D. O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNow: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE FIRsT AMENDMENT (1981); Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of
Freedom, 62 IOwA L. REv. 1 (1976); Kushner, Freedom to Hear: The First Amendment,
Commercial Speech and Access to Information, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 137 (1981); Emerson,
supra note 44; Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting, 22 STAN. L. REv. 861
(1970).
55. See supra note 44.
56. See, ag., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (reversing conviction for posses-
sion of pornography in home).
57. See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969).
58. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386 ("[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media
justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them."); CBS v. Democratic
Nat'I Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973) (scarcity of broadcasting frequencies). But see FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116 n.11 (1984) (acknowledging criticism of
scarcity rationale but awaiting signal from Congress or FCC that technological change war-
rants rethinking). The FCC views the first amendment as requiring listeners' interests to
outweigh speakers' in broadcasting: "[T]he purpose of the First Amendment is not simply to
protect the speech of particular individuals, but rather to preserve and promote the informed
public opinion which is necessary for the continued vitality of our democratic society and
institutions." The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974); see also Note, Broad-
cast Deregulation and the First Amendment: Restraints on Private Control of the Publicly
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In a few cases, the Supreme Court has protected listeners' rights
not to hear speech they find offensive. 9 Generally, however, courts
require offended listeners to turn off the radio, throw away offensive
mail, or avert their eyes.6° The right-not-to-hear theory illustrates
the difficulty of enforcing a general right to hear: if one group of
listeners wants to hear an idea that another group finds offensive, it
is impossible to decide which group should win.61
The right to hear is often "little more than artistic camouflage to
protect the interests of the willing speaker."62 Nonetheless, listen-
ers' rights have been protected even when the speaker has no right
to speak.63 Protection of the right to hear thus cannot be based
entirely on its correlation to the right to speak.
Owned Forum, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 517 (1980) (arguing that market forces are not sufficient to
protect public's constitutional right derived from ownership of the airwaves).
59. E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (allowing FCC to protect listeners
from words they might find indecent); Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728
(1970) (allowing addressees to decline to receive mail to which they object by registering with
the post office); cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983) (invalidating
federal statute excluding unsolicited advertising of contraceptives from mail; the Court distin-
guished Rowan, holding that the government itself rather than the addressee was attempting
to stop the flow of information to protect recipients from offensive speech).
60. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (government cannot suppress
speech to protect unwilling listeners unless the speech impinges on substantial privacy
interests).
61. In Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1274 (1983), for example, a television program was cancelled in
response to listener protests. Other potential listeners then challenged the action, based on
their right to hear. 688 F.2d at 1035-36.
The listeners' rights concept has been articulately challenged by FCC Commissioner
Robinson:
The First Amendment may indeed belong to everybody-as the listeners' rights
theory suggests-but it cannot truly belong to everybody unless it first belongs to
each and every particular somebody. To deny the individual right in the name of
the collective right transforms the First Amendment from a guarantee of individual
freedom into its very opposite, rule by public clamor. To be sure, this interference
is intended to further the "spirit" and "larger purposes" of the First Amendment.
For my part, however, I prefer to entrust my political freedoms to the Constitution
rather than to the ardent schemes of well-meaning persons. ...
[W]e err when we stray beyond the simple proposition that the First Amend-
ment is a restraint on government-nothing less, but also nothing more ....
[R]ejection of the listeners' rights idea expressed in Red Lion ...would, at least,
have the clear virtue of removing from the debate over fairness the misleading and
mischievous notion that the First Amendment is an expression of the right of the
public, through their government, to regulate speech in the interest of listeners.
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 588 F.C.C.2d
691, 706-77 (1976), affd in part, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926
(1978).
62. M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 46.
63. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-19, at 675-76 (noting that in Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the mail that Lamont had a right to receive came from persons
or organizations abroad whose speech was unprotected).
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Perhaps, as Justice Blackmun has recently written, "the princi-
ple involved. . . is both narrower and more basic than the 'right to
receive information.'"" If the first amendment is a structural limi-
tation on government power, or a liberty doctrine,65 it may include
a right to be free from unwarranted governmental censorship in the
system of expression.6 This right could be asserted by listeners
when government acts "for the sole purpose of suppressing expo-
sure to . . . ideas."67 Recognition of such a right eliminates the
conceptual and practical difficulties with affording listeners a gen-
eral right to receive information.68 A right to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental censorship, coupled with the concept that
some purposes for governmental speech are illegitimate,69 could
limit government's ability to speak and to censor speakers in its op-
eration of public broadcasting outlets.7"
II. THE THEORY OF A RIGHT TO ACCESS
The theory that government has an affirmative obligation to en-
courage freedom of expression 71 encompasses both speakers' rights
to effective forums and listeners' rights to hear diverse views. The
issues are analogous to those raised by government broadcasting.72
The only difference is that government broadcasting may involve
state action violating speakers' and listeners' first amendment
rights.73
The access theory promotes both the instrumental and the au-
64. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 878-79 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
65. See Baker, supra note 34, at 966.
66. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-19, at 675-76.
67. Pico, 457 U.S. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
68.
The denomination of a concrete constitutional public's right to know, or press privi-
leges and affirmative rights of access, not only commits the Court to extraconstitu-
tional decision making and violates the principle of separation of powers.
Concomitantly, the inevitability of judicial delimitation of the scope of the public's
right to know poses the potential for more restraints and dilution of First Amend-
ment freedoms.
D. O'BRIEN, supra note 54, at 166.
69. See infra notes 115-32 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 204-69 and accompanying text.
71. See B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 3 ("Demands for access challenge the laissez-faire
premises of the First Amendment, asking whether a largely unregulated dissemination of
ideas should give way to legal guarantees of effective expression.").
72. Access rights to both public and private media involve the question of whether mo-
nopoly or near-monopoly power over information should give rise to an affirmative obligation
to present the viewpoints of some persons that the broadcaster would not otherwise present as
a matter of editorial discretion. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 3.
73. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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tonomy values of the first amendment. Individual speakers' rights
are enhanced by assuring them an opportunity to speak in some
forums 74 that are arguably more effective than would otherwise be
available to them.75 Societal values are furthered by guaranteeing
greater diversity of expression, creating competition in the search
for truth, and promoting intelligent self-government.76
A. Access to Private Media
In a society that fears monopoly power and the pervasive influ-
ence of the media,77 a right of access to private media is attractive.
The concentration of media ownership in a few hands, 78 the dwin-
dling number of newspapers,79 and the predominance of the three
74. Access rights of speakers include a right of guaranteed or equal access to public
forums, a right to reply to defamation, a right to advertise a product in a medium which has
monopoly power over the product's market, and a right to publish or broadcast opposing
views on important public issues. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 15-16.
75. "The most powerful and persuasive forums-television, radio, and newspapers-are
to a great extent beyond the reach of most political and social minority groups." Comment,
supra note 39, at 1411-12.
76. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 33. But see T. EMERSON, supra note 31, at 671 (any
effort to solve the problem of a monopolistic press by forcing access is likely to undermine the
press' independence without achieving diversity; government encouragement of a greater
number of outlets, rather than compelling access to a few outlets, would be preferable).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945)
(antitrust laws are based on belief that "great industrial consolidations are inherently undesir-
able" and are designed to stop "great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the
individual before them"); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) (courts must favor "the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with
as many different facets and colors as is possible [because] right conclusions are more likely to
be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection"),
affd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Kaufman, Reassessing the Fairness Doctrine: Should the First
Amendment Apply Equally to the Print and Broadcast Media?, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1983
(Magazine), at 17 (broadcasters "exert substantial influence over how we perceive the world"
so that the purpose underlying the fairness doctrine "is particularly significant in the context
of political campaigns, where the impact of expensive media advertising threatens the viabil-
ity of our democratic system"); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-51 (1978)
(allowing FCC determination that midday broadcast of a profane comic monologue was of-
fensive, because broadcasting is uniquely pervasive and available to children). But see Bran-
dywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting) ("we should recall that the printed press was the only medium of mass communi-
cation in the early days of the Republic. . . . To argue that a more effective press requires a
more regulated press flies in the face of what history has taught us."), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
922 (1973).
78. National newspaper chains and wire services now dominate newspaper publishing,
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249 (1974), and the three major
networks produce most of the programs shown on commercial television. Robinson, The
Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv.
169, 260 (1978).
79. Fewer than 30 cities currently have competing, separately owned newspapers. N.Y.
Times, June 18, 1982, at A18, col. 1.
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major television networks8" all raise the specter of monopoly con-
trol over information by the traditional mass media."1 As a result,
accepted majority views have many effective outlets for expression,
but controversial and minority views have far fewer and less effec-
tive forums.82 Further, the public increasingly perceives the press
as being subjective and biased; this perception makes required ac-
cess appealing to those who believe more balanced views would
result.8 3
As early as 1945, the Supreme Court found that the government
had an affirmative obligation to offset media power.84 But even
more important for access proponents was the Court's statement
more than twenty years later that "[i]t is the right of viewers and
listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is paramount."8' 5
Practical problems would overwhelm a broad access right that
assured all citizens an opportunity to express their views effec-
tively.86 Instead, the Supreme Court has upheld only narrowly
drawn statutory rights of access to the electronic media, 7 under
which broadcast licensees have been allowed broad discretion.
8
80. See Robinson, supra note 78, at 260.
81. "As I see it, AT & T's First Amendment rights are secure; we have to be concerned
that it does not use its economic clout to deny the First Amendment rights of others."
Wicklein, Electronic Censors, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., July-Aug. 1983, at 54.
82. Comment, supra note 39, at 1411-12.
83. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 2.
84. United States v. Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see L. TRIBE, supra note 6,
§ 12-22, at 694 ("government may, and perhaps must, act positively to reduce" suppression
of expression by private interests).
85. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
86. Such a broad access right presumably would mean that denying a broadcast license
to anyone would amount to a denial of free speech. Yet, with a limited number of radio
frequencies, this is obviously an impossible reading of the requirements of the first amend-
ment. See id. at 388. See also B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 19 ("Resolute equality of access
would end only in access to the Government Printing Office.").
87. In CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Court held that the
Constitution did not require access to radio and television for political advertisers, but a
majority of the Court thought the first amendment was not a barrier to such a right if it were
created legislatively or adminstratively.
The Court upheld a statutory and limited right of access to the electronic media for candi-
dates for federal office in CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). However, it invalidated FCC
rules requiring access to cable television, not on constitutional grounds, but because the FCC
had exceeded its statutory authority. FCC v. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979).
88. The FCC has only once mentioned the fairness doctrine in rejecting an application
for renewal of a broadcast license. Note, The Future of Content Regulation in Broadcasting,
69 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 563 n.70 (1981). Despite this lack of enforcement, the fairness doc-
trine may still chill broadcast speech. Market forces may better ensure a diversity of voices.
See, eg., Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L.
REv. 207 (1982).
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In general, courts have treated private broadcasters as some-
thing less than speakers. In contrast, they have treated newspaper
editors as speakers, affording them full first amendment protec-
tion.89 The Supreme Court has resoundingly rejected a speaker's
right of reply in the print media.90 However, courts have granted
access rights when newspapers perform noneditorial functions such
as selecting advertisements for their commercial sections.91
B. Access to Public Media
Speakers have been granted a limited right of access to state-
owned media, such as student newspapers of state-operated univer-
sities. As one commentator has noted, "The First Amendment has
not required state media to subsidize the costs of an individual's
public expression."92 When access has been ordered, the courts
have limited it to the placement of paid advertisements by the
groups which the publication serves.93
Moreover, the access rights granted generally have not collided
with state employees' initial editorial choices. Instead, the courts
have protected both speakers' rights and student editors' rights to
be free from censorship by their superiors.94 In fact, student editors
have enjoyed more protection from their publishers than editors
and reporters for private publications.9 Courts also have recog-
nized that student editors must make choices for legitimate govern-
ment purposes, such as assuring quality or relevancy of subject
matter,96 and have therefore held that student editors may deny ac-
89. Some commentators view the differing standards of protection as an accommodation
of the values of diversity and autonomy, with the press enjoying autonomy and the electronic
media being responsible for diversity. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 36.
90. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
91. See, eg., Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274 (Ist
Cir. 1982) (newspaper not allowed to refuse to run rental service advertisement because it had
monopoly on advertising of home rentals).
92. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 240.
93. Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (state college student news-
paper which accepted commercial advertisements could not reject editorial advertisements);
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (high school newspaper cannot refuse
advertisements opposing Vietnam War when paper has run stories on war-related matters).
94. Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) (state university cannot punish
editor of student newspaper for publishing a segregationist statement; "if a college has a
student newspaper, its publication cannot be suppressed because college officials dislike its
editorial comment").
95. See M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 218 ("From the perspective of blunting govern-
ment's communications powers, it is quite sensible to see student editors as having First
Amendment rights that. . . reduce the capacity of school officials to control the information
transmitted to student listeners.").




III. GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND GOVERNMENT FORUMS
For first amendment purposes, government operation of com-
munications media can be viewed either as government speech or as
government sponsorship of a forum for expression.97 Government
speech by definition involves content control;98 government opera-
tion of a forum almost by definition precludes content control. 99 As
a speaker, government may act illegitimately by drowning out pri-
vate speech, thus distorting the political process or infringing on
individual choice.'" As sponsor of a forum for expression, govern-
ment may act illegitimately by censoring the content of speech,
again distorting the political process and infringing on individual
choice.' 01
Both views require limitations on government operation of com-
munications media, but the remedies may differ.'0 2 When govern-
ment speech dominates the marketplace, an injunction against such
speech or a guarantee of equal access for opposing points of view is
a possible remedy.'0 3 When government operates a forum, the
usual remedy is an assurance of access.' 4
A. State Action
Constitutional guarantees generally protect individual rights
article because exercise of editorial discretion is essential), cerL denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
"With respect to government-owned or -operated media, access guarantees derived from the
Constitution may be invoked if the government has no legitimate interest in exclusion." B.
SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 240 (emphasis added).
97. See Note, supra note 11; see also Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw.
U.L. REv. 237, 244 (1978): "Nor can an acceptable free speech theory demand that govern-
ment be an ideological eunuch; the theory must be subtle to distinguish government as censor
from government as speaker, and discerning enough to distinguish the government voice that
merely adds to public debate from the government voice that monopolizes it."
98. See M. YuDoF, supra note 3; Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political
Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979); Shiffrin, supra note 4; Ziegler, Govern-
ment Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REv. 578
(1970); Comment, Unconstitutional Government Speech, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 815 (1978);
Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93
HARV. L. REV. 535 (1980).
99. See infra notes 133-53 and accompanying text.
100. M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 260-61.
101. Id. at 235.
102. See Note, supra note 11, at 1173-74.
103. See infra notes 115-32 and accompanying text; see also Ziegler, supra note 98, at
598-600 (urging comprehensive legislation to eliminate such government speech in political
elections).
104. See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
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against detrimental government action. 105 To reach either govern-
mental speech or governmental forum analysis, a court must find
that the government has acted in a manner that amounts to "state
action." Public broadcasting stations operated by state or local gov-
ernments have been viewed by courts and commentators as state
actors. 106 The speech of an individual government employee, how-
ever, may not meet the state action requirement necessary for it to
be subject to constitutional restraints; indeed, sometimes such
speech is constitutionally protected. 107 Similarly, private print me-
dia not infused with the concept of public ownership are not subject
to attack by those claiming a constitutional right to speak.' 08
B. Government Speech
Government speech is neither constitutionally protected nor
constitutionally prohibited.)09 However, it must be limited when it
conflicts with the societal and individual interests protected by the
first amendment. 10
The concept of government speech is closely allied with that of
state action. To qualify as government speech, an activity must at
least be state-supported, though it need not be expressly endorsed
nor represent the government's official policy."'
Government speech can promote first amendment values. It
provides more information for the political process and can ensure a
diversity of information to counter the power of large media organi-
105. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 393 (1982) (to find state action,
deprivation of right must be caused by exercise of right or privilege created by state or rule of
conduct imposed by state and the party charged with deprivation must fairly be considered to
be a state actor).
106. But see infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (discussing whether operation of
publicly funded broadcast media constitutes state action).
107. Ziegler, supra note 98, at 606.
108. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
109.
[T]here is nothing in the negative force of the First Amendment, as a general mat-
ter, that would prevent the government from using public funds to support various
features of the system of freedom of expression. On the other hand, the negative
features of the First Amendment do impose some restrictions upon the way govern-
ment funds are expended. In general these limitations would be the same as in the
case of the government furnishing physical facilities: there could be no discrimina-
tion among users and no regulation of content.
T. EMERSON, supra note 31, at 651.
110. Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 607 ("If a system of free expression is to be preserved, either
custom, or statutes, or constitutionally based limitations must provide assurances that gov-
ernment speech will not unfairly dominate the intellectual marketplace.").
111. Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 565 n.*; see infra note 173.
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zations. 1 2 Government speech also helps to achieve other societal
goals, for example, by promoting community values.' 13 However, it
can distort the political process. When government's voice is too
strong, it can .indoctrinate citizens, overpower private sources of in-
formation, manipulate the electoral system, infringe on individual
judgment, and force taxpayers to support points of view with which
they disagree.' 14
C. Limits on Government Speech
The sources of constitutional limitations on government speech
are unclear. Most commentators agree that although government
has no constitutional right to speak," 5 the Constitution does not
prohibit government speech." 6 Thus, those individuals who wish
to challenge government speech must assert that the speech in-
fringes on their personal constitutional rights. Potential sources of
limitations on government speech advanced by commentators in-
clude the press clause,' ' 7 the guaranty clause, 1 8 equal protec-
tion," 9  political rights,12 0  an implied right against political
establishment, 12 or, more generally, the speech clause. 122
Until recently, few commentators have attempted to devise a
theory of limitations on government expression.2 3 The pervasive-
ness of governmental communication, coupled with some recent
abuses, has brought about renewed debate.' 24
Most objections to government speech focus on the idea that
112. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
113. Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 568.
114. Id. at 588-605.
115. M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 44-45 (first amendment is a source of limitations on
government, not a source of government rights; "it is inconceivable that governments should
assert First Amendment rights antagonistic to the interests of the larger community").
116. "[G]overnment as speaker is not constrained by the First Amendment, nor need it
provide access to the channels of communication employed by government. . . . T]he First
Amendment [currently restricts] the government only when it plays the role of regulator and
not when it itself communicates ..... G. GUNTHER & F. SCHAUER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 381 (Supp. 1983).
117. Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 618-19.
118. Ziegler, supra note 98, at 618.
119. Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 619-21.
120. Id. at 619.
121. Kamenshine, supra note 98, at 1104.
122. Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 621.
123. "Students of the Constitution endlessly debate whether small groups of Nazis may
march. But the march of government, a communicator immensely more powerful than a
small group of malcontents, is ignored." M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 16.
124. See sources cited, supra note 98.
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some kinds of expression are beyond the scope of government's reg-
ular functions and limited powers under a democratic system of
government.1 25 When government seeks to intervene too directly or
too powerfully to influence citizen opinion, its speech is suspect.'
26
Thus, direct governmental intrusion into the electoral process, by
financing campaigns for legislation, referendums, or constitutional
amendments, or by endorsing particular candidates, is viewed as
outside government's proper sphere and therefore unconsti-
tutional. 127
Another major objection to government speech is that it can
dominate the marketplace. 128 Government speech could distort
public opinion and unduly influence public decisions. In most situ-
ations, however, the government's structure prevents it from over-
powering other voices.129 Government does not speak with a single
voice. The legislature, for example, can counteract executive domi-
nation and distortion of the political process.130 In addition, there
often are many decisionmakers within the governmental structure,
ensuring that a single monolithic view is not presented. 131
The third objection to government speech is that it may impinge
on individual autonomy. However, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that government cannot compel speech or coerce an individual
into carrying a government message.1
32
D. Government Forums
The public forum doctrine provides the foundation for the sec-
ond set of first amendment limitations on government-operated me-
dia. 13 3  The doctrine imposes both affirmative and negative
125. T. EMERSON, supra note 31, at 699 ("government's right of expression does not
extend to any sphere that is outside the governmental function").
126. See id. at 579; Comment, supra note 98, at 835-36.
127. See Ziegler, supra note 98, at 585.
128. L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-4, at 590 (government can "add its own voice to the
many that it must tolerate, provided it does not drown out private communication").
129. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 607.
130. M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 47.
131. Cf. infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (public broadcasting decisionmaking
is sufficiently decentralized and restricted to limit government control of programming
decisions).
132. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state cannot require citizen to
display state motto on license plate); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (state cannot compel flag salute).
133. See Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931;
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Karst,
Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment on Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247 (1976); Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974
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obligations on the government's operation of public facilities; gov-
ernment must make some forums available for expressive purposes,
and cannot regulate the content of speech in such forums.
As originally delineated, the theory recognized three kinds of
government facilities. The purpose and function of each kind of
facility determined the degree of access allowed to speakers. 134
Speakers have a guaranteed right of access to traditional public fo-
rums, such as streets and parks, subject only to content-neutral
time, place, and manner regulations.'35 Speakers also are guaran-
teed access to quasi-public forums, which are not open to the gen-
eral public but are used primarily for purposes compatible with
peaceful expression.136  In both public and quasi-public forums,
speakers have a right of equal access; government cannot disallow
access to a forum because of the content of speech when it has al-
ready allowed other views. 137 In nonpublic forums, however, gov-
ernment may totally bar expression or discriminate among
speakers, even on the basis of content, as long as the regulation is
reasonable in light of the forum's purpose.1 38 Speakers' rights thus
depend heavily on whether a government facility is found to be a
public forum.139
The Supreme Court has applied several tests to determine
whether a government-controlled facility is a public or quasi-public
forum. If the facility traditionally has been used for expression, it is
a true public forum."4 Similarly, if government has designated the
facility as a public forum by allowing speakers to use it, the facility
may be treated as a public forum.' 4 ' Finally, if the expression is
SuP. CT. REv. 233; Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Pub-
licly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1982); Note, The Public Forum: Minimum
Access, Equal Access and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REv. 117 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Note, The Public Forum]. On the relationship of public forum doctrine to state-
owned communications media, see Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor
Implications for Public Broadcasting, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1123 (1974); Comment, supra note 39;
Note, supra note 11.
134. See Note, The Public Forum, supra note 133.
135. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
136. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1979).
137. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (once a state university opened a forum to
students generally, it could not exclude a student group because of the content of its speech).
138. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 957 (1983).
139. See Karst, supra note 133, at 248-52 (the Court tends to find public facilities are not
public forums "[t]o escape this phantom of the all-devouring public forum"); cf. Shiffrin,
supra note 4, at 588 ("the decisions. . . provide little by way of principle to determine how
much or how little government control of content should be permitted").
140. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 574.
141. But see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974) (government
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compatible with the normal activity of the particular place at a par-
ticular time, the facility may be considered a public forum.'42
E. Limitations on Government Forums
As applied by the Supreme Court, the public forum doctrine has
become an all-or-nothing proposition. 14 3 If a public forum is in-
volved, government regulation is severely limited, but in a nonpub-
lic forum, government can discriminate among users even on the
basis of content."4 Further, the Court appears to have abandoned
any notion of access to nontraditional forums in which expression is
compatible with the facility's main purpose and not substantially
disruptive.' 45 Last Term, the Court noted that the only kinds of
government property that qualify as public forums are those that
"by long tradition or by government designation [are] open to the
public at large for assembly and speech."' 46
Justice Brennan has argued for a distinction between content-
based discrimination and viewpoint discrimination. 47 The core of
public forum analysis protects individuals against viewpoint dis-
crimination, that is, government's restriction of particular view-
points once it has allowed discussion of a general subject. 4 "
Viewpoint discrimination, according to Justice Brennan, is "censor-
ship in its purest form."' 49 Content-based discrimination, on the
other hand, occurs when government distinguishes between the sub-
jects of discussion. Apparently, the Court's current analysis pro-
scribes only viewpoint discrimination,' abandoning its prior
could ban political advertising on its buses even though it had allowed commercial
advertising).
142. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116.
143. Karst, supra note 133, at 248-52.
144. See Perry, 103 S. Ct. at 957.
145. See M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 235 ("Where it is difficult to distinguish the eco-
nomic costs. . . and the communications activity does not substantially impair the function-
ing of government, any distinction [between ordinary use and use for expression] is motivated
by a desire to limit expression.").
146. Minnesota Bd. v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 1064 (1984).
147. Perry, 103 S. Ct. at 961-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 962. The distinction appears to parallel guaranteed access and equal access
rights under public forum theory. If a place is a public forum, so that government must
provide guaranteed access to it, Justice Brennan apparently would require content-neutral
selection among speakers. If a place was not a public forum, but the government had allowed
some speakers, he likely would require that government not discriminate between viewpoints,
but might allow government to make subject matter distinctions.
149. Id. at 964.
150. "It is possible to claim [the discrimination allowed in Lehman, 418 U.S. 298] is a
discrimination among types of speech rather than among viewpoints, but the effect seems
indistinguishable." L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-21, at 692.
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position that government must remain content-neutral in choosing
among speakers seeking access to public forums.
A requirement of content-neutrality in its most extreme form
would treat government-owned media as common carriers. In CBS
v. Democratic National Committee,151 two Justices espoused this
view. Justice Douglas argued that "[t]he Government as owner and
manager [of a publicly owned medium] would not. . . be free to
pick and choose such news items as it desired." '152 Justice Stewart
went further: "Were the government really operating the electronic
press, it would . . . be prevented by the First Amendment from
selection of broadcast content and the exercise of editorial judg-
ment."153 Under these views, government-operated media could
make no distinctions among speakers seeking access to its facilities.
IV. PUBLIC BROADCASTING: GOVERNMENT
SPEECH OR FORUM
A. History of Public Broadcasting
Fear of federal government censorship was a primary motive for
the creation of a decentralized system of public broadcasting. 54
The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967155 established the basis for the
current system. The Act created the nonprofit, nongovernmental
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) 156 to provide funding
for noncommercial stations. In 1970, another independent, non-
profit organization, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), was or-
ganized to distribute programs nationally among a membership co-
operative of noncommercial licensees, with funding from CPB.
15 7
151. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
152. Id. at 149-50 (Douglas, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 143 (Stewart, J., concurring).
154. See Canby, supra note 133, at 1150-56.
155. Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-99
(1982)). The Act resulted primarily from the Carnegie Commission's report on public televi-
sion, supra note 13.
156. Pub. L. No. 90-129, tit. II, 81 Stat. 365, 367-73 (1967) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 396 (1982 & West Supp. 1984)). The Act bars the CPB from owning or operating
stations and networks, and specifies that CPB is not a government agency and that its board
members are not government employees. 47 U.S.C. §§ 396(b), 396(g)(3) (1982). The Act
also prohibits any government department or officer from interfering with the corporation.
Id. § 398(a).
The Carnegie Report recommended a guaranteed source of funds from an excise tax on
television sets to further remove the CPB from government control, but Congress left the
corporation subject to annual appropriations. See CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 13, at 68.
157. See Canby, supra note 133, at 1156. PBS has asserted some control over program-
ming content. Id. at 1156-57.
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Scattering programming decisions among various independent
agencies, and allowing individual licensees to control their own pro-
gramming, substantially diminish the danger that the federal gov-
ernment will attempt to control program content. Moreover, other
statutory restrictions preclude government censorship. These in-
clude a limitation on federal government contributions to noncom-
mercial stations of no more than forty percent of a station's
budget, 158 a mandate on the CPB to present objective, balanced pro-
gramming about controversial issues, 59 and an express ban on cen-
sorship by government officers and agencies. 60 Public television
licensees also are subject to most of the regulations applicable to
commercial licensees, including the fairness doctrine.' 6 1
Even though the system was designed to ensure that the federal
government did not control programming decisions, at least one ad-
ministration has attempted to influence the content of public broad-
casting. CPB responded by trying to drop the controversial
programming. 162
Beyond the concern with federal government control is that of
state or local government control. Of the approximately 285 public
television stations, 132 are licensed to state or municipal agencies,
and 77 are licensed to colleges and universities, many of which are
public.163 As one court noted, "with state and local governments
firmly entrenched as gatekeepers to the public's access to informa-
tion, the fox has been asked to guard the henhouse."' 64
158. 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(3) (1982).
159. Id. § 396(g)(1)(A). However, this mandate is not enforceable against the CPB by
the FCC, Accuracy in Media v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
934 (1976), or by the courts, Network Project v. CPB, 561 F.2d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978).
Recently, 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982), which prohibited noncommercial licensees from edito-
rializing, was found to be unconstitutional in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct.
3106 (1984). The Court did not decide whether a similar ban restricting only state and local
government-operated stations would be constitutional. See id. at 3125 n.24. The Court noted
that the Administration had proposed a 1977 amendment to the statute to allow editorializ-
ing by all public broadcasting stations except those licensed to government entities. Id.
160. 47 U.S.C. § 398(c) (1982).
161. Accuracy in Media, 521 F.2d 288, 295-96 (programs broadcast on noncommercial
station held subject to FCC review, despite CPB funding).
162. See Canby, supra note 133, at 1157-58. In 1973, the Nixon administration and some
members of Congress criticized the "objectivity and balance of some PBS network program-
ming." Id.
163. Barnstone v. University of Houston, 514 F. Supp. 670, 683 (S.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd,
660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981), afl'd on rehearing sub nom. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television




B. The Muir Decision
In Muir v. Alabama Educational Television Commission
(AETC),1 65 two state-operated public television stations scheduled
and then cancelled a controversial program, Death of a Princess.1 66
Viewers of public stations operated by the AETC and by the Uni-
versity of Houston sought to compel the broadcast, claiming that
the cancellation violated the first and fourteenth amendments. One
district court ordered the University of Houston to broadcast the
program,167 but another district court dismissed a similar complaint
against AETC.161 In separate appeals, the dismissal was affirmed
and the order to show the program was reversed. 169 After consoli-
dation and rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit, in Muir III, denied
165. 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 1274 (1983). See Comment,
The Death of a Princess Cases: Television Programming by State-Owned Public Broadcasters
and Viewers' First Amendment Rights, 36 U. MiAMI L. REv. 779 (1982); 13 CuM. L. REV.
397 (1982).
166. Death of a Princess was part of a regularly scheduled series on the stations involved.
688 F.2d at 1036. It depicted the execution for adultery of a Saudi Arabian princess and her
lover. In response to Saudi Arabian government protests, the Carter administration pres-
sured PBS to change or cancel the program, see Note, supra note 11, at 1165-66 n.32, and
PBS notified public broadcasting stations that the program contained controversial material.
Id. at 1165 n.5. Alabama citizens and at least one Alabama businessman with Saudi interests
expressed concern to the AETC about the program's content. 688 F.2d at 1053-54 (Johnson,
J., dissenting). Commissioners of the AETC, who presumably are not involved in regular
programming decisions, made the decision to cancel the program. In Texas, a university
vice-president, who had never made a programming decision in his 17 years with the univer-
sity, decided to cancel the program. Id. at 1054. The university had recently entered into a
contract to instruct a member of the Saudi Arabian royal family. Id. at 1037 n.5. Both
Alabama and Texas officials justified their decisions on the grounds of fear for the safety of
Americans in the Middle East, and fear of exacerbating tensions in the Middle East. Id. at
1036-37. Thus, they seemed to be protecting the sensitivities of the Saudi government, not
the sensitivities of American viewers.
If the reason for cancellation was fear of repercussions in the Middle East, the stations'
management may have been engaged in foreign policy decisions, an area reserved to the fed-
eral government. The stations' actions thus arguably were in pursuit of an illegitimate state
purpose. See, eg., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Cons. & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983) (state economic requirements for nuclear power plants not preempted by
federal government because NRC regulated safety only and Congress intended limited state
control); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state alien registration statute preempted
by federal government).
167. Barnstone v. University of Houston, 514 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Barnstone IJ, rev'd, 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Barnstone II],
affid on rehearing sub nom. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th
Cir. 1982) (en banc) [hereinafter cited as Muir III], cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 1274 (1983).
168. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, No. 80-G-0607-S (N.D. Ala. July 3,
1980) [hereinafter cited as Muir I], aff'd, 656 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Muir II], affd on rehearing 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1274 (1983).
169. Muir II, 656 F.2d 1012; Barnstone II, 660 F.2d 137.
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potential viewers the right to compel the stations to broadcast the
program. 170
1. State Action
First amendment protection is triggered only by state involve-
ment in the infringement of constitutional rights.1 7 1 The court in
Muir III assumed that operation of a public television station by a
state agency constituted state action. 172
170. Muir 111, 688 F.2d 1033.
171. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
172. Apparently, the parties did not dispute the existence of state action in either case.
Instead, they disagreed over whether the stations were public forums, a problem which pre-
supposes state action. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. Under recent Supreme
Court decisions, the Muir III stations might have argued that the cancellation of Death of a
Princess was not state action, even though the stations were licensed to state government
agencies and run by state government employees.
A comprehensive review of the state action doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court
in a series of recent decisions is beyond the scope of this Note. Those recent decisions appar-
ently make it necessary not only to assess the involvement of a statutorily established agency,
state employees, state funding, and state regulation, but also to assess the functions being
performed by the putative state actors. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320-22
(1981) (the public defender was a state employee but not a state actor because she performed
a private function and was not amenable to state supervision); Phillips, The Inevitable Inco-
herence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 683, 710 (1984) (arguing that
Polk may indicate that state action will be based on a private-public function distinction,
releasing formally public actors from constitutional restraints if their operations are intrinsi-
cally private); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (decision by statutorily estab-
lished committee of nonstate employees to transfer patients between private hospitals not
state action despite state funding and regulation); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (discharge of employees by private school administrators not state action although the
school received nearly all its students under the authority of a state statute and more than
90% of its income from public funding); cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939-
42 (1982) (private creditor was state actor in obtaining ex parte writ of attachment issued by
clerk of court under state statute and executed by sheriff).
As to the application of state action to the Muir III stations, the AETC controls and
supervises a statewide network of nine noncommercial educational television stations licensed
to the state of Alabama. $ee ALA. CODE § 16-7-1 (1975 & Supp. 1984) (establishing AETC).
The AETC has authority to control and supervise the use of channels reserved to the state for
noncommercial educational use, to make rules and regulations governing station operations
and programming, and to own and operate noncommercial television and radio stations. Id.
§ 16-7-5. Members of the Commission are appointed by the governor and paid a stipend by
the state. Id. § 16-7-2; see also id. §§ 16-7A-1, -4, -5 (creating the Alabama educational
television foundation authority to receive and distribute donated money, but not for carrying
out propaganda, attempting to influence legislation, or engaging in political campaigns).
AETC is funded by state appropriations, matching federal grants, and private contributions.
Muir II, 688 F.2d at 1036. Texas funds and operates the University of Houston; the Univer-
sity, as licensee, funds and operates the public television station. Id. at 1037. The University
of Houston is overseen by a Board of Regents appointed by the governor; the Board can
appoint and remove any faculty member, officer, or employee. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§§ 111.11, -. 12, -.19 (Vernon 1972).
The only one of the recent Supreme Court decisions finding no state action in the activi-
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Whether the operation of other publicly funded television sta-
tions constitutes state action is not clear.173 Indeed, the CPB itself
is not considered a state actor174 even though it is governmentally
created and funded and its board members are appointed by the
President.171
2. Government Forum
The Muir and Barnstone decisions leading up to Muir III ap-
plied different public forum tests to reach different results. The
ties of a state employee emphasized that a public defender's professional responsibility man-
dated the exercise of independent judgment and rendered her unamenable to administrative
direction. Polk, 454 U.S. at 321. Although it could be argued that the officials involved in
Muir III were necessarily exercising independent judgment in carrying out their responsibil-
ity to operate stations in the public interest, the government editors involved were amenable
to administrative direction. Only that administrative direction, not the government editors'
initial decision, was challenged.
The actions of the editors' superiors based on political considerations meet the Polk test:
the superiors appear to be carrying out state policy and are amenable to political direction.
Conceding that government editors generally are not state actors should not preclude an
assertion that they were unduly influenced by political considerations rather than a legitimate
communicative purpose. In Muir III, for example, the decision to cancel Death of a Princess
should not have escaped scrutiny even if it had been made by the responsible editors under
pressure from their superiors.
In the context of government editors, it has sometimes been argued that there is no state
action in the activities of student editors of state university student newspapers. See, eg.,
Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 1976) (no state action
when state university student newspaper rejected an advertisement about homosexual coun-
seling services because no university official was involved in the rejection), cerL denied, 430
U.S. 982 (1977); Comment, Student Editorial Discretion, the First Amendment, and Public
Access to the Campus Press, 16 U.C.D. L. RaV. 1089, 1098-112 (1983) (arguing that student
editors are not state actors when editorial decisions are made without administrative over-
sight). Like student editors, government employee editors of state broadcasting stations are
not always expected to do what higher government officials tell them to do. Government
editors are to some extent isolated from political pressures-and removed from direct state
supervision-by the layers between them and elected officials and by the more objective,
professional standards they use to guide their editorial decisions. See infra notes 234-42 and
accompanying text. Because the editors do not behave like state actors who are under the
direction of the state and are carrying out what appears to be state policy, there is less need to
restrain their actions.
173. It is clear, however, that the speech of other noncommercial stations is constitution-
ally protected. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3127 (1984) (ban on
editorializing by noncommercial stations overbroad by taking in wide range of speech by
"wholly private" stations).
174. Network Project v. CPB, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2399 (D.D.C. 1979); see also
Canby, supra note 133, at 1152 n.170 (discussing Carnegie Commission's concerns about
applicability of first amendment to CPB). But see Note, Freeing Public Broadcasting from
Unconstitutional Restraints, 89 YALE L.J. 719 (1980) (arguing that both CPB and PBS are
state actors and that current public broadcasting system creates unconstitutional prior re-
straints on noncommercial broadcasters).
175. 47 U.S.C. § 396(b), (k) (1982); see supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
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court in Barnstone I used a compatability test: since the forum was
controlled by government and was an appropriate place for the
communication of ideas, it was a public forum. Therefore, the sta-
tion could not deny access based on the content of speech without
violating the prohibition on prior restraints.'76 The Muir II court,
in contrast, found that the AETC station was not a public forum,
because public forums include only places dedicated to general pub-
lic use. 177 In Muir III, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, found that
access rights to public television stations would be incompatible
with the government's primary purpose in operating the stations,
and inconsistent with the essential task of exercising editorial
discretion. 1
78
The decision in Muir III was grounded in a two-part public fo-
rum test: whether the facility was a traditional public forum or
designed to accommodate a general public right of access, and
whether access was not incompatible with the facility's primary ac-
tivity.179 Applying the second part of the test, the court said: "The
pattern of usual activity for public television stations is the statuto-
rily mandated practice of the broadcast licensee exercising sole pro-
gramming authority. The general invitation extended to the public
is not to schedule programs, but to watch or decline to watch what
is offered." 18 In light of the court's finding that there was no pub-
lic forum, viewers could not challenge the station's programming
decisions, even if those decisions were based on the communicative
impact of the speech involved.'
81
3. Government Speech
Although the Muir 11 court had found that government broad-
176. 514 F. Supp. at 685.
177. 656 F.2d at 1020. One commentator has suggested the public forum argument was
doomed to failure; public forum doctrine generally secures a right of access to speak in cer-
tain public facilities, and the Muir 11 and Barnstone I plaintiffs were asserting a right to hear.
See Comment, supra note 167, at 802-04.
178. 688 F.2d at 1042.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. "If a speaker does not have a right of access to a facility, that facility by definition is
not a 'public forum' and the speaker is without grounds for challenge under the public forum
doctrine." Id. at 1043. In other words, the state broadcaster is functioning like a private
broadcaster, and should be limited only to the same extent. This argument appears close to
the public-private function distinction in state action theory. See supra note 172. Perhaps the
court's holding that there was no public forum and thus no first amendment right was a
disguised finding of no state action.
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casters were entitled to first amendment protection, 182 the court in
Muir II found that only statutory rights and obligations protected
the public licensees' free exercise of programming discretion."8 3
This lack of constitutional protection did not mean that speakers' or
listeners' rights automatically outweighed the government's interest
in exercising editorial discretion;184 it meant only that the federal
government might be able to impose greater restrictions on public
licensees than on private ones.
18 5
According to the court, cancellation of the program was not
censorship even though it was based on the program's content.
1 8 6
A public television station must "necessarily make discriminating
choices," and some of those choices can be characterized as " 'polit-
ically motivated.' ""7 In essence, the court found no relevant dif-
ferences between the roles of private broadcasters and public
broadcasters-both are required to operate in the public interest,
providing sufficient protection for speakers' and listeners' rights.188
The Muir III court refused to apply Board of Education v.
Pico,189 a case which suggests that governmental discretion is lim-
ited when government acts as speaker, as well as when it operates a
public forum.1 9 In Pico, a plurality of the Supreme Court found
that students' first amendment rights may have been abridged when
a school board committee removed books from the school li-
brary.191 The school board's motive for removing the books would
determine whether its actions were constitutional. "[L]ocal school
boards may not remove books from school library shelves simply
182. Muir II, 656 F.2d at 1016.
183. 688 F.2d at 1041.
184. "To find that the government is without First Amendment protection is not to find
that the government is prohibited from speaking or that private individuals have the right to
limit or control the expression of government." Id. at 1038.
185. Id. at 1041.
186. Id. at 1043-47.
187. Id. at 1044.
188. "[I]t is clear that Congress concluded that the First Amendment rights of public
television viewers are adequately protected under a system where the broadcast licensee has
sole programming discretion but is under an obligation to serve the public interest." Id. at
1041. If listeners believe their rights are being infringed, they may petition the FCC. Id. at
1047-48.
189. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
190. The Fifth Circuit first distinguished the case and then dismissed it because the
"Supreme Court decided neither the extent nor, indeed, the existence. . . of First Amend-
ment implications in a school book removal case." Id. at 1045 & n.30. The court noted that
a majority of the Justices did not join any opinion in the case. Id. at n.30.
191. A plurality said that the constitutionally protected right to receive information and
ideas was a corollary of the right to speak, necessary if the listener is to exercise his rights of
speech, press, and political freedom meaningfully. 457 U.S. at 867.
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because they dislike the ideas contained in those books."' 9 2
This limitation does not apply to public television stations, said
the Muir I court, because public broadcasters, unlike libraries,
must comply with the fairness doctrine, and public broadcasters,
again unlike libraries, have many legitimate reasons for canceling a
previously scheduled offering.' 93
C. Public Trustee
Congress did not envision public broadcasting as either a com-
mon carrier1 94 or a forum for government speech. 195 Instead, it cre-
ated the public broadcasting system to bring greater diversity and
excellence to programming, by supplementing commercial broad-
casting with high-quality offerings that might appeal only to limited
audiences.196 To do this, Congress prescribed a system virtually
parallel to private broadcasting. 97 The Muir I court agreed that
public broadcasters have essentially the same rights and obligations
in making programming content decisions as private broadcasters
have.19 8
Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how a regulatory
scheme designed to balance the constitutional rights of speakers, lis-
teners, and private broadcasters can be applied to a state-operated
broadcasting station.199 Private broadcasters may be public trust-
ees, but the Constitution protects their editorial choices.2° In con-
trast, the Muir III court found that the Constitution does not
protect state broadcasters' editorial choices.2° ' Only by finding that
no one has any constitutional right to speak or hear in the context
192. Id. at 872.
193. 688 F.2d at 1045-46.
194. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Communications Act of 1934
prohibits FCC from imposing common carrier obligations through access requirements).
195. See M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 124-29 ("government only funds public broadcast-
ing in America; it has not sought to play an editorial role").
196. CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 13, at 13-14.
197. See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
198. 688 F.2d at 1041-43.
199. In first amendment terms, there is a conceptual difference between private broad-
casters, even if they have great power over the market of ideas, and state employees subject to
state supervision. See supra note 173. Repression of diversity by private broadcasters does
not encounter the central first amendment proscription against censorship by government.
See supra note 1. But cf. Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 585 n.14 (arguing that CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) "amounts to a holding that a finding of state action does not
preclude content judgments").
200. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
201. 688 F.2d at 1038. But see FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3120
(1984) (holding that public broadcasters have first amendment protection).
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of state broadcasting can government's interest outweigh the pub-
lic's. 20 2 Yet that finding would contradict a basic premise of broad-
cast regulation in general-that listeners' rights predominate over
private broadcasters'. 0 3
V. PROTECTING RIGHTS IN THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED
MEDIA
The merger of government speech and government forum analy-
ses in a case like Muir suggests a series of first amendment limita-
tions on a government's operation of communications media. Like
government speech, state public broadcasting is presumptively con-
stitutional. 21 As long as government is not attempting to manipu-
late political opinion or to coerce private choices, and sufficient
structural safeguards exist, there is no need to limit its speech.205
Government forum analysis then provides additional reasons for re-
stricting government power over its communications medium ac-
cess rights for speakers and limitations on content-based
regulations.20 6 The two modes of analysis thus help to balance the
rights of speakers, listeners, and government editors, providing a
safeguard against undue government interference with the system of
free expression.207
A. Speakers' Rights
Private speakers could be guaranteed a right of access to state
public broadcasting stations under either the prior restraint theory
or the public forum doctrine.20 8
1. Prior Restraints
Government bears a heavy burden of justification whenever it
imposes prior restraints on speech.20 9 This prohibition against prior
restraints does not guarantee a forum for the speaker, but instead
202. 688 F.2d at 1038.
203. See, eg., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (arguing that
listeners' interests are paramount to broadcasters').
204. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 115-32 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 133-53 and accompanying text. Under the public forum doctrine,
content discrimination might be limited unless it is essential to avoid substantial disruption of
the forum's purpose. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
207. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
208. See Comment, supra note 39passim; Note, supra note 11, at 1175-81.
209. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 658
(1955).
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removes a bar to the speaker's publication.21°
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,2" the Supreme
Court applied the prior restraint prohibition against a state commu-
nications medium, holding that a municipal theater unconstitution-
ally restrained speech when it refused to allow the presentation of a
musical.21 2 Application of the prior restraint theory to state public
broadcasting is difficult because it would virtually nullify any gov-
ernment editorial discretion; the procedural safeguards required to
impose a valid prior restraint213 would substitute the courts' judg-
ment for that of the government editors.214
2. Access Theory
Treating government broadcasting as a pure public forum would
be problematic, because unlimited public access would disrupt the
operation of a broadcasting outlet;2 5 editorial discretion is a neces-
sary element of broadcasting. 216 Nonetheless, it is possible to re-
quire that a government-owned communications medium provide
access to private speakers to the extent that speech is not incompati-
ble with the facility's effective operation.217
Professor Canby has proposed a two-part test for determining
speakers' rights of access to government-run communications me-
dia218 "whether the facility to which access is sought is an appro-
priate forum for speech . . . [and] whether the medium is one in
which the state necessarily exercises an editorial function. '219 If ed-
itorial discretion is necessary, and alternative modes of expression
are available, access should be denied.22° Thus, access would be
210. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
211. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
212. Id. at 556.
213. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965) requires that (1) the state bear the
burden of proving that the speech is not constitutionally protected; (2) any restraint before
judicial review be brief and limited to preserving the status quo; and (3) prompt, final judicial
review be available.
214. See Note, supra note 11, at 1180-82 (noting this problem and suggesting an altera-
tion of the Freedman safeguards to compensate for it).
215. See B. SCHMIDT, supra note 38, at 99:
The Supreme Court is increasingly inclined to protect the functions of the public
place from potentially disruptive expressive activity. Judgments depend not so
much on balancing the value of expression against impairment of public function, as
on determining whether there is significant disruption. If there is disruption, the
expressive activity is not protected.
216. See Muir II, 688 F.2d 1033, 1044 (1982).
217. See Comment, supra note 39.
218. See Canby, supra note 133, at 1133.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1134.
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required to government media that can function "as well or better
as a truly open forum," such as advertising sections and auditori-
ums operated by government agencies.
221
Other commentators have suggested an accommodation 222 or
balancing 2 approach to access rights. These approaches also track
the "compatibility" public forum test;224 access would be guaran-
teed if the expressive activity is compatible with the primary use of
the forum and does not substantially disrupt that use.
Just as access rights may be limited by the necessity of govern-
ment's exercise of editorial discretion, governmental discretion also
may be limited by individual access rights. Professor Karst would
limit government's editorial discretion to that aimed at furthering
professional, rather than personal or political, ends. 2 5 Those who
are aware of the professional standards in a particular medium
would make the decisions, decentralizing power and separating the
decisionmaking from political considerations. 226 Discretionary
decisionmaking is permissible, according to Professor Karst, only
when its purpose is to achieve a compelling goal.227 Thus, a munici-
pal theater can choose to show only plays that meet the criteria for
221. Id. at 1133-34.
222. Under the accommodation approach, if the facility can continue to function "sub-
stantially uninterrupted when access is limited according to guidelines demanded by the fo-
rum's nature, then the court should not refuse some form of qualified access merely because
total access would materially disrupt the forum." Comment, supra note 39, at 1455. If some
form of access is compatible with the nature of the forum, the accommodation approach
would allow access to the extent that it did not interrupt effective operation of the facility,
and would permit editorial discretion to the extent necessary to continue operation of the
forum.
The result. . . would be the impingement upon one first amendment interest for
the purpose of obliging the other-to a greater or lesser degree depending on the
forum. Such accommodation is not inconsistent with the first amendment, because
it is not an "abridgement" of expression. If the sum total of speech interests is
being advanced, presumably the first amendment is not being violated.
Id. at 1455-57.
223. Professor Karst has suggested balancing the speaker's interest in access against the
state's interest in exercising editorial discretion. If government abuses its editorial discretion
by excluding opposing views, courts should intervene to guarantee equal access. Karst, supra
note 133, at 257-58.
Professor Karst has also argued that the need to exercise editorial discretion does not
always necessitate exclusion of others from the forum. It only means that editorial discretion
will normally outweigh access interests. Id. at 256-57.
224. See, eg., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
225. Karst, supra note 133, at 257-58.
226. These decisionmakers would be more likely to base their decisions on legitimate
content distinctions. Id.
227. "[W]hen government is the proprietor of any forum, it is constitutionally permitted
to regulate speech content only to the degree necessary to further . . . a compelling state
interest." Id. at 259.
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a specific series, or only plays that a professional decisionmaker has
determined to be well-written. But it may not, as in Conrad,228 re-
fuse to present a play because a governing board which has not seen
or read the play determines that it is not suitable for the commu-
nity.229  When a government actor abuses its discretion, courts
should not hesitate to intervene and grant access to speakers under
equality principles.23 °
B. Editors' Rights
The limitation on editorial discretion extends not only to state
broadcasters but to private broadcasters as well. The limitation on
the latter is derived from the idea that they are mere trustees of a
publicly owned resource.231 Logically, government broadcasters
should be limited not only by the public trustee role, but also by
constitutional principles. The actions of a government editor may
be state action,2 32 which may infringe others' rights to speak or
hear. Nevertheless, a government editor can assert his own consti-
tutional rights against the government,233 and these rights also may
limit government's power to suppress speech.
1. Delegation Doctrine
Professor Yudof, who disfavors judicial control over govern-
ment speech in most instances, 234 suggests that courts should en-
force a structural limitation on governmental power to
communicate. He advocates a limitation which arises from the
traditional delegation of day-to-day decisions and editorial responsi-
bility to lower echelon editors of government communications me-
dia.231 Such delegation removes much of the threat of content
228. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); see supra notes 211-
14 and accompanying text.
229. Id. at 548.
230. Karst, supra note 133, at 257-58. "The first amendment interest in access to an
audience is especially strong when other viewpoints are being presented to that audience.
Correspondingly, government normally has no legitimate interest in presenting one point of
view on an issue while excluding others." Id. at 255.
231. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 172.
233. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (when employee expression is
about a matter of public concern, first amendment protects him from undue actions such as
dismissal by employer).
234. See M. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 259.
235. Applying this principle to public broadcasting, Professor Yudof has indicated that
"the charge that public broadcasting is a propaganda arm of the federal government is simply
ill-founded." Id. at 133.
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control; editors are less likely to be politically motivated, and decen-
tralization of decisionmaking renders it more difficult to turn the
medium into a uniform government propaganda mechanism.2 36
Delegation should be judicially enforced: "Where such delega-
tion has voluntarily taken place, courts ought to treat its ad hoc
withdrawal in order to censor particular communications as a viola-
tion of the First Amendment." '237 Withdrawal of delegation be-
comes unconstitutional when the purpose is not to make sure that
the forum carries out a legitimate function, but instead to eliminate
objectionable ideas.23 8 Judicial enforcement of the delegation doe-
trine thus would limit government's ability to dominate the system
of expression without "compromising the integrity of its communi-
cation efforts. ' 23 9
2. Protection of the Editoral Function
Closely allied with the delegation doctrine is Professor Canby's
suggestion that the editorial function should be protected from cen-
sorship by the editor's superiors." A court should first determine
how editorial responsibility has been delegated. Then, it must de-
termine whether the editors themselves have first amendment pro-
tection from censorship, by considering the nature of the medium,
its scope and purpose, and how much editorial responsibility has
been delegated.2 1  The state has a great deal of discretion in its
initial decision to delegate editorial responsibility, but once it has
been delegated, the state "cannot selectively intervene to delete ma-
terial or discipline editors."2 42
C. Listeners' Rights
Although speakers' and editors' rights can buttress listeners'
claims of a right to be free of unwarranted governmental censor-
ship, sometimes listeners' claims must stand alone. For example, no
speaker may have a right to speak in the particular government-
oIerated forum, and no editor may have a right to be free from
censorship by his superiors.243
236. See id. at 135-38.
237. Id. at 243.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 244.
240. See Canby, supra note 133, at 1134-49.
241. Id. at 1141.
242. Id. at 1148.
243. Even if the government editors do have an enforceable right against their employer,
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Board of Education v. Pico,244 despite its uncertain precedential
value,2 45 is important to the analysis of government- owned commu-
nications media because four Justices found that a listener, not a
speaker or an editor, had a potential first amendment claim against
the government.246 The Court recognized that substantial discre-
tion was necessary for effective operation of public schools. How-
ever, a plurality found an unconstitutional exercise of discretion
when the school board intended to deny students access to ideas
with which the board disagreed. 47 Similarly, Justice Blackmun in
concurrence argued that government actors may not restrict access
to information when their motive is disapproval of the ideas
involved.248
The plurality's focus on a right to receive information is difficult
to justify in the public school context, since public school officials
have discretion to prescribe the curriculum and to choose text-
books.24 9 Similarly, an unlimited right to receive information seems
incompatible with the public broadcasting context, where govern-
ment editors must exercise discretion unless they are to operate sta-
tions as common carriers.2 5° Justice Blackmun's independent bar
on "state action calculated to suppress novel ideas or concepts"2 1
provides a first amendment source for viewers to challenge specific
suppressions of speech on government-operated media when they
could not challenge general selection of programming.
it is unlikely that they will go into court to enforce it, at least in the absence of disciplinary
action against them.
244. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
245. The Pico plurality opinion, based on a right to receive information, was joined by
only three Justices; Justice Blackmun concurred on the basis of a prohibition against state
discrimination between ideas. The fifth Justice concurring in the result, Justice White, found
it unnecessary to reach the first amendment issues. Id.
The Muir III court concluded "that Pico is of no precedential value as to the application
of the First Amendment to these issues." 688 F.2d at 1045 n.30.
246. Although Justice Blackmun did not believe that there was a general right to receive
information, he agreed that students' rights had been violated by the state's action. 457 U.S.
at 878-79. "In effect, my view presents the obverse of the plurality's analysis: while the
plurality focuses on the failure to provide information, I find crucial the State's decision to
single out an idea for disapproval and then deny access to it." Id. at 879 n.2.
247. Id. at 871.
248. Id. at 879-80.
249. The plurality limited the scope of its opinion to the removal of library books, which
are optional rather than part of the curriculum. Id. at 862. Furthermore, the plurality said
the inculcative functions of the schools are limited to the classroom, while libraries are in-
tended to expose students to a diversity of ideas as well. Id. at 869.
250. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
251. 457 U.S. at 880.
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D. Protecting the System of Expression
1. Access Proposals
The Constitution does not bar government from operating com-
munications media;252 government operation of media such as pub-
lie television stations may even be "essential to fulfilling the
government's role of assuring" diversity.253 Once a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest in operating media is recognized, some measure
of governmental editorial discretion and control over program con-
tent becomes essential.254 Thus, unlimited public access to state
broadcasting outlets is questionable.255 Although the limited public
forum concept is attractive, it would require courts carefully to dis-
tinguish among different government forums to determine the ap-
propriate degree of access that should be allowed. 5 6
Even though general or limited public access rights may be im-
practical, the methods by which governments make their editorial
judgments should still cause concern.2 57 Muir 111258 is a poignant
example. What seems so egregious about the cancellations of Death
of a Princess is not that a controversial show was not televised; few
would question an initial decision not to carry the program. But
the circumstances under which the decisions were made and the
status of the government officials making the decisions create the
appearance that government was making a "conscious decision to
exclude the public from exposure to facts or opinions because the
governmental decisionmaker deem[ed] such exposure harmful. 25 9
2. Proposed Substantive and Procedural Limits
A system of first amendment limitations on government speech
and censorship in its communications media should accommodate
both the legitimate government interests in speaking and the con-
cerns about undue governmental interference with the system of
free expression. Several assumptions would underlie such a system.
252. See Canby, supra note 133, at 1165.
253. See Comment, supra note 39, at 1450.
254. Canby, supra note 133, at 1150.
255. Id.
256. See Comment, supra note 39, at 1455 (arguing that public officials should affirma-
tively provide for access to state-owned communications media to eliminate the need to resort
to the courts).
257. See Canby, supra note 133, at 1149-64 (applying this concern to public broad-
casting).
258. 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cern denied, 103 S. Ct. 1274 (1983).
259. MuirlI, 656 F.2d 1012, 1028 (Clark, J., dissenting). For the facts of Muir, seesupra
note 167.
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First, government communication is a legitimate state purpose,
and substantial editorial discretion is necessary to achieve that pur-
pose.2 60 The amount of editorial control necessary will differ with
the nature and specific purpose of the forum itself, just as it does
under public forum doctrine.261
Second, because effective operation of a communications me-
dium requires substantial discretion, there should be a presumption
against an individual right of access for speakers. Stated another
way, the actions of government editors should be presumptively
constitutional. z62
Third, a speaker or viewer could overcome the presumption by
demonstrating that government had refused access, not because the
speech substantially interfered with government's legitimate com-
municative interests, but solely because government wanted to keep
the message from the public. 2 63 Factors to consider in determining
whether the speech was suppressed solely for an illegitimate pur-
pose would include significant departures from the usual editorial
process and evidence that the decisionmaking process was extraor-
dinarily politicized and ad hoe.261 Upon proof that government's
260. See Canby, supra note 133, at 1165 ("The end of public broadcasting as a coherent
voice would only reduce the quantity, quality, and diversity of the total broadcasting
offering.").
261. Id. at 1133-34.
262. Otherwise, they would have to justify initial programming decisions, which would
make effective operation of the forum virtually impossible. See Note, supra note 11, at 1181.
263. See supra note 1.
264. The plurality in Pico noted that:
[Tihis would be a very different case if the record demonstrated that petitioners had
employed established, regular, and facially unbiased procedures for the review of
controversial materials . ... [The students'] allegations and some of the eviden-
tiary materials presented below do not rule out the possibility that petitioners' re-
moval procedures were highly irregular and ad hoc-the antithesis of those
procedures that might tend to allay suspicions regarding petitioners' motivations.
457 U.S. at 874-75.
Professor Tribe, although agreeing with the result, criticized Pico.
[The decision revealed] very little that is enduring. The only thing to be found there
is the existence of a bare majority of five Justices in search of some limits on book
banning by school officials. . . . The upshot of all this. . . is to shift the power of
censorship from school boards to Supreme Court Justices . ...
Tribe, Censorship of School Libraries: Intuition in Search of a Principle, 1981-82 THE
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 209 (1983). In Pico, however, the
Supreme Court did not censor books. Rather, it compelled school board members to articu-
late legitimate motives before censoring books. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 876.
A similar concern was voiced by the Muir III court. "Judicial reassessment of the propri-
ety of a programming decision made in operating a television station involves not only inter-
ference with station management but also reevaluation of all of the content-quality-audience




sole purpose was to suppress speech, the government's decision
would become presumptively unconstitutional, although it may still
prove that the same action would have resulted from pursuit of le-
gitimate purposes. 265
Fourth, remedies would vary, depending upon the status of the
person asserting the right to be free from the government's uncon-
stitutional actions. Speakers would generally press an access claim,
and thus would seek a guarantee of their right to speak in the fo-
rum. Government editors might seek to compel reinstatement or to
enjoin future interference with their editorial judgments. Listeners
might seek to compel the government to present opposing views, or
to enjoin some forms of government speech.
A forum in which no one can exercise editorial discretion is an
undesirable place to speak.266 This approach avoids that problem
by presuming that speakers have no right of access to government-
operated media. Because the approach presumes the validity of de-
cisions made by government editors under regular editorial proce-
dures, it also promotes the government's interests in speaking, and
avoids impinging on the first amendment rights of government edi-
tors.2 67 Yet, it maintains first amendment protection by establish-
ing that suppression of speech is an illegitimate government
purpose.268 When no legitimate government communication inter-
ests are at stake, this approach allows speakers and listeners to
assert a right to be free from unwarranted governmental censor-
ship.269 It also ensures that when government suppresses expres-
sion, it must at least articulate better reasons than fear of the
message.
VII. CONCLUSION
When government operates a communications medium, it has
the power not only to increase the diversity of views being ex-
pressed, but also to decrease diversity by suppressing views with
which it disagrees. The first amendment provides a potential re-
straint on this power, reflecting the role of free speech in assuring a
system of self-expression and self-government. This Note has sug-
265. This standard was suggested by the plaintiffs and adopted by one of the dissenting
opinions in Muir III. 688 F.2d at 1060 (Reavley, J., dissenting). It is based on Mt. Healthy
School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
266. See Comment, supra note 39, at 1444.
267. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 1.
269. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
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gested a governmental speech analysis that would limit govern-
ment's voice when it pursues an illegitimate purpose. Further,
governmental forum analysis provides a limitation on governmental
regulation of speech for the purpose of suppressing ideas and infor-
mation. These limits can be applied to governmental operation of
public broadcasting stations by speakers, listeners, and editors as-
serting a right to be free from unwarranted government censorship.
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